Artin's braid groups have been recently suggested as a new source for public-key cryptography. In this paper we propose the first undeniable signature schemes using the conjugacy problem and the decomposition problem in the braid groups which are believed to be hard problems.
Introduction
Recently braid groups have been suggested as an alternate platform for doing publickey cryptography. The birthdate of braid group based cryptography can be traced back to the pioneering work of Anshel et al. in 1999 [2] and Ko et al. in 2000 [16] .
Since then, braid groups attracted the attention of many cryptographers due to the 0 *Research supported by CSIR, New Delhi, under award number: 2-31/97(11)-E.U.II fact that, they provide a rich collection of hard problems like the conjugacy problem, braid decomposition problem and root problem and there are efficient algorithms for parameter generation and group operation [4] .
Since the construction of a Diffie-Hellman type key agreement protocol and a public key encryption scheme by Ko et al. in 2000 [16] , there have been many attempts to design other cryptographic protocols using braid groups. Positive results in this direction are construction of a pseudorandom number generator by Lee et al. in 2001 [19] , key agreement protocols by Anshel et al. in 2001 [1] , an implementation of braid computations by Cha et al. in 2001 [4] , digital signature schemes by Ko et al. in 2002 [15] , entity authentication schemes by Sibert et al. in 2002 [23] and a provably-secure identification scheme by Kim et al. in 2004 [14] .
In this paper, we construct some undeniable signature schemes using braid groups. Digital signatures bind signers to the contents of the document they sign.
The ability for a third party to verify the validity of a signature is usually seen as the basis for the non-repudiation aspect of digital signatures. The authenticity of a digital signature can be verified by anyone having the public key of the signer.
However, this universal verifiability property of digital signatures is not always a desirable property. Such is the case of a signature binding parties to a confidential agreement, or of a signature on documents carrying private or personal information.
Chaum and van Antwerpen [6] introduced the concept of undeniable signatures for limiting the ability of third parties to verify the validity of a signature. An undeniable signature, like digital signature depends on the signer's public key as well as on the message signed. Such signatures are characterized by the property that, verification can only be achieved by interacting with the legitimate signer through a confirmation protocol. On the other hand, the signer can prove a forgery by engaging in a denial protocol. If the signer does not succeed in denying (in particular, if it refuses to cooperate) then the signer remains legally bound to the signature. On the other hand the signer is protected by the fact that his signature cannot be verified by unauthorized third parties without his own cooperation.
Undeniable signatures have got immense real life applications. Almost all the undeniable signature schemes constructed so far have been based on integer factor-ization [10] and discrete logarithm problems [6] , [5] . Our work is the first to present undeniable signature schemes based on braid groups or even in any nonabelian group setting. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the construction of efficient cryptographic protocols based on hard problems in braid groups. Our schemes are based on the conjugacy search problem, multiple simultaneous conjugacy search problem, braid decomposition problem and the multiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem. In Section 2, we briefly review the basics of braid groups. We describe in Section 3 the preliminaries needed for this paper. A simple undeniable signature scheme and a modified one is described in Section 4. A zero-knowledge undeniable signature scheme is given in Section 5. We prove the completeness, soundness and zero-knowledgeness (where ever applicable) of the protocols also. The paper concludes with some general remarks in Section 6.
An Overview of Braid Groups
In this section, we briefly describe the basics of braid groups, hard problems in braid groups. A good introduction to braid groups is [3] and survey articles on braid cryptography are [17] , [7] .
Geometric Interpretation of Braids
A braid group B n is an infinite non-commutative group arising from geometric braids composed of n-strands. A braid is obtained by laying down a number of parallel strands and intertwining them so that they run in the same direction. The number of strands is called the braid index. Braids have the following geometric interpretation:
an n-braid (where n ∈ N) is a set of disjoint n strands all of which are attached to two horizontal bars at the top and bottom such that each strand always heads downwards as one moves along the strand from top to bottom. Two braids are equivalent if one can be deformed to the other continuously in the set of braids.
Let B n be the set of all n-braids. B n has a natural group structure. Each B n is an infinite torsion-free noncommutative group and its elements are called n-braids.
The multiplication ab of two braids a and b is the braid obtained by positioning a on the top of b. The identity e is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands and the inverse of a is the reflection of a with respect to a horizontal line. Let S n be the symmetric group on n symbols. Given a braid α, the strands define a map p(α) from the top set of endpoints to the bottom set of endpoints. In this way we get a homomorphism p : B n → S n .
Presentations of Braid Groups
Any braid can be decomposed as a product of simple braids known as For each integer n ≥ 2, the n-braid group B n has the Artin presentation by generators σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n−1 with relations
where |i − j| ≥ 2, and Lemma 2.1. [9] The homomorphism p : B n → S n restricted to D n is a bijection.
Hence non-repeating braids are also known as permutation braids. From this lemma it follows that |D n | = n!. In this way we can identify D n with S n .
Let LB n and RB n be two subgroups of B n consisting of braids obtained by braiding left ⌊ n 2 ⌋ strands and right n − ⌊ n 2 ⌋ strands, respectively. That is,
Then we have the commutativity property that for any α ∈ LB n and β ∈ RB n , αβ = βα. These subgroups of B n are used in designing various cryptographic protocols.
Canonical Decomposition of Braids
For two words v and w in B n , we say that v ≤ w, if w = avb for some a, b ∈ B + n . Then ≤ is a partial order in B n [9] .
There is a bijection between the set of all permutation braids and the set of all canonical factors [9] . Thus a canonical factor can be denoted by the corresponding permutation π ∈ S n . By π ∆ , we mean the permutation corresponding to the fundamental braid ∆.
For a positive braid P , we say that the decomposition P = A 0 P 0 is left-weighted if A 0 is a canonical factor, P 0 ≥ e and A 0 has the maximal word length among all such decompositions. A left-weighted decomposition P = A 0 P 0 is unique [4] . A 0 is called the maximal head of P . Any braid x can be uniquely decomposed as
and the decomposition A i A i+1 is left-weighted for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 [4] . This unique decomposition is called the left canonical form of x and so it solves the word problem. Since each canonical factor corresponds to a permutation braid, x can be denoted as
Hence for implementation purposes the braid x can be represented as the tuple 
Hard Problems in Braid Groups
We use the following hard problems in our signature schemes.
Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
Let (x, y) ∈ B n × B n , such that y = a −1 xa, where a ∈ B n or some subgroup of B n . The conjugacy search problem is to find a b such that y = b −1 xb.
Multiple Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem (MSCSP)
Let (x 1 , a −1 x 1 a), . . . , (x r , a −1 x r a) ∈ B n ×B n for some a ∈ B n or some subgroup of B n . The multiple simultaneous conjugacy problem is to find a b such that,
Braid Decomposition Problem (BDP)
Let (x, y) ∈ B n × B n , where y = a 1 xa 2 for some (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ LB n × LB n . The braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (
Multiple Simultaneous Braid Decomposition Problem (MSBDP)
Let (x 1 , a 1 x 1 a 2 ), . . . , (x r , a 1 x r a 2 ) ∈ B n × B n for some (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ LB n × LB n .
The multiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem is to find a pair (
Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the initial system set up, intractability assumptions, an assumption regarding the cardinalities of certain sets and some notation used in this paper are described.
Initial Setup
The system parameters n and l are chosen to be sufficiently large positive integers and are made public. Let H : {0, 1} * → B n and h : B n → {0, 1} k be collision free hash functions.
Since the braid group B n is discrete and infinite, we cannot have a uniform probability distribution on B n . But there are finitely many positive n-braids with l canonical factors, we may consider randomness for these braids. Such a braid can be generated by concatenating l random canonical factors.
We fix positive integers n, l as system parameters. Let
Then |B n (l)| ≤ l(n!) l and so LB n (l), RB n (l) and B n (l) are finite sets. We use the random braid generator given in [4] (which produces random braids in O(ln) time)
for generating random braids. Also, we consider uniform probability distribution on these sets.
By, SRB p we mean some subgroup of RB m , where
Notations
We use the following notations through out this paper.
• By a ∈ r A, we mean a random choice of an element a from the set A.
• By P Q −→ V , we mean P sends Q to V .
Intractability Assumptions
We assume that the hard problems CSP, MSCSP, BDP, MSBDP, stated in Section 2.5 are intractable in braid groups.
An Assumption on the Cardinality of a Set
We assume that for 'sufficiently large' values of n and l and random choices of α, β, γ ∈ B n (l), a 1 , a 2 ∈ LB n (l) and a ∈ RB n (l), the cardinality of the set E a (β, γ)
defined by
is 'sufficiently large'. In this paper, we do not undertake any theoretical or numerical study to check the validity of this assumption. This assumption is rewritten below and will be used in the security analysis of some of our protocols.
Assumption 3.1. Let n, l be 'sufficiently large' positive integers and α, β, γ ∈ r B n (l), a 1 , a 2 ∈ r LB n (l) and a ∈ r RB n (l). Then the cardinality of the set E a (β, γ) is bounded below by a nonconstant polynomial function p(n, l) of n and l.
A Simple Undeniable Signature Scheme
This section describes a simple undeniable signature scheme based on multiple simultaneous braid decomposition problem (MSBDP).
Public and Private Keys
The system is set up by the signer (Alice) in the following manner: Alice chooses random braids α ∈ B n (l) and a 1 , a 2 ∈ LB n (l) and computes x = a 1 αa 2 . She sets her public key as (α, x) and private key as (a 1 , a 2 ).
We shall denote by P K the tuple (α, x) generated as above.
Signature Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to sign a message m. She computes S m = a 2 ya 
The Confirmation Protocol
Here we present a zero-knowledge confirmation protocol. It is carried out by two players, a prover (P ) and a verifier (V ). The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ P K and a pair (m,Ŝ m ). For the case that Ŝ m is a valid signature of m, P will be able to convince V of this fact, while if the signature is invalid then no prover (even a computationally unbounded one) will be able to convince V to the contrary except with a negligible probability.
Signature Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a 1 , a 2 ∈ LB n (l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ P K, y and allegedŜ m .
1. V chooses a ∈ r RB n (l), computes the challenge Q = a −1 (Ŝ m x)a and V Q → P . Proof. Completeness: Let S m be a valid signature. P computes
2 )c = ba −1 (yα)ac.
which V verifies after getting (b, c) from P and accepts the signature as valid. Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness: By Assumption 3.1, there are at least p(n, l) choices for a ∈ RB n (l), which give the same value of Q but giving different values of R. Hence it is infeasible for a cheating prover P * to distinguish between these different values of a, even if he has infinite computational power. Therefore a cheating prover P * , even computationally unbounded, cannot convince V to acceptŜ m / ∈ SIG(m) with probability greater than
. Thus the protocol is sound.
Zero-knowledgeness: There are two difficulties in the analysis here. Since B n is an infinite discrete group, we can not have a uniform probability distribution on B n . Also, for the implementation purpose we need to restrict to a finite subset B n (l) of B n . Unfortunately B n has no finite nontrivial subgroup. So at some computational stages in the protocol, the elements may fall out of B n (l). Hence we only give a sketch of the proof here.
For the ease of analysis let us assume that at Step 2, P chooses (b, c) ∈ r B 2 n and computes R ∈ B n . So, we can treat R as a random element of B n . Also since
, any random choice of (b, c) ∈ B n (l) 2 by P in practice makes the response R to appear as a random element. Hence the protocol can be treated as zero-knowledgeable.
Signature Denial Protocol
The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ P K and a pair (m,Ŝ m ). In the case thatŜ m / ∈ SIG(m), P will be able to convince V of this fact, while ifŜ m ∈ SIG(m) then no prover (even a computationally unbounded) will be able to convince V that the signature is invalid except with negligible probability.
Let SRB n 1 and SRB n 2 be two subgroups of RB n consisting of braids obtained by braiding left n 1 strands and right n 2 strands, respectively (where
Then we have the commutativity property that for any σ ∈ SRB n 1 and τ ∈ SRB n 2 , στ = τ σ.
The Denial Protocol
P computes the responses R
If equality holds V acceptsŜ m as an invalid signature, else P is answering improperly. . Proof. Completeness: Assume thatŜ m / ∈ SIG(m). We have,
2Ŝ m a 1 αa and
2Ŝ m a 1 αb.
As ab = ba, we get,
Hence the protocol is complete.
Soundness: Assume thatŜ m ∈ SIG(m). Let R 1 and R 2 be the responses given by
In the worst case, we may regard β as a known constant for P when he tries to determine R 2 . But then the ability to determine R 2 amounts to the establishment of an invalid signature, which contradicts Theorem 4.1 (soundness of the confirmation protocol). Hence the protocol is sound.
A Blackmailing Attack
In this subsection, we show that any non zero-knowledge version of the confirmation protocol is susceptible to a blackmailing attack. That is, if the prover does not check the challenge Q of the verifier, he is susceptible to a black mailing attack.
This type of attack for the discrete logarithm based undeniable signature schemes was suggested by M. Jakobsson [12] . M. Jakobsson noted that the protocol in [6] has the following weakness that Alice proving the correctness of her signatures never knows what signature is being verified. Using these weaknesses of the undeniable signatures he showed that how an adversary can blackmail a signer.
For illustrating this attack in our case, we consider the following non-zero knowledge version of the confirmation protocol given in Section 4.3.
Signature Confirmation Protocol
1. V chooses a ∈ r RB n (l), computes the challenge Q = a −1 (Ŝ m x)a and V Q → P .
P computes the response
3. V verifies that R = a −1 (yα)a. If it holds, V acceptsŜ m as a valid signature of P . Now, suppose that Eve has found out that (m, S m ) belongs to Alice (Eve might be Bob itself). Now we will show, how Eve can convince k entities E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E k that the signature pair belongs to Alice.
Let SRB n 0 , SRB n 1 , . . . , SRB n k be k + 1 subgroups of the n-braid group RB n , where n−⌊ n 2 ⌋ = n 0 +n 1 +. . .+n k , for some appropriate positive integers n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k .
Each SRB n i is the subgroup of RB n consisting of braids made by braiding n i -strands from the left among n−⌊ n 2 ⌋ strands with the order n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k . Let n −1 = 1. Then for i = 0, 1, . . . , k,
and we have the mutual commutativity property that for any α i ∈ SRB n i and α j ∈ SRB n j with i = j, α i α j = α j α i .
The Protocol

Eve asks each {E
2. Eve chooses a secret braid a 0 ∈ RB n 0 (l) and computes Q 0 = a
4.
Eve convinces Alice to engage in a confirmation protocol for a message pair (m, Sm). 
Eve
(Q k ,R,m) −→ E i , for i = 1, . . . k. 8. E i a i −→ Eve, for i = 1, . . . k.
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. Each E i checks whether Q k = a −1 S m xa and R = a −1 yαa. If it holds they will be convinced that Alice signed the message m.
, each one of them will be able to convince himself that the signature belongs to Alice.
Proof. By Assumption 3.1, it follows that
, since each a i is a random braid chosen and kept secret by E i . By checking Q k = a −1 S m xa, each E i will be convinced that Eve has not cheated them by forming the challenge Q 0 corresponding to some other signer.
Blinding
The above signature scheme is a deterministic signature scheme whose security is based on the hardness of MSBDP. MSBDP may become easier as the number of available braid pairs increases. In our case, the parameter r in MSBDP is the number of messages signed. So to make the scheme more secure, we may modify the scheme by blinding the signatures using random braids. The modified scheme can be described as follows.
Signature Generation
To generate a signature on a message m the signer proceeds in the following way.
1. Signer chooses r ∈ r LB n (l).
2. Computes S m = ra 2 ya −1 1 , where y = H(m).
Outputs the signature (m, S m ).
The confirmation and denial protocols are exactly similar to the protocols given in the earlier case. A non zero-knowledge version of the confirmation protocol is given below for an illustration.
The Confirmation Protocol
Input : Prover: Secret key a 1 , a 2 ∈ LB n (l), and blinding factor r ∈ r LB n (l).
Common: Public key (α, x) ∈ P K, y, and allegedŜ m .
1. V chooses a ∈ RB n (l) computes the challenge Q = a 
A Zero-knowledge Undeniable Signature Scheme
In this section, we describe an undeniable signature scheme in which the denial protocol is also zero-knowledge.
Public and Private Keys
The system is set up by the signer (Alice) in the following manner: Alice chooses α ∈ r B n (l) and a 1 , a 2 ∈ r LB n (l) and computes x = a 1 αa 2 . She sets her public key as (α, x) and the private key as (a 1 , a 2 ).
We shall denote by P K, the tuples (α, x) generated as above.
Signature Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to sign a message m. She computes S m = a 1 ya We denote by SIG(m), the set of valid signatures on m.
The Confirmation Protocol
The confirmation protocol in this case is exactly similar to the protocol given in Section 4.3.
Denial Protocol
Here we describe a zero-knowledge denial protocol. The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (α, x) ∈ P K and a pair (m,Ŝ m ).
In this protocol, we use a zero-knowledge commitment function called blob. blob(r, t) perfectly hides the value of t as long as r is secret and once the value of r is revealed one can open the blob and get the value of t.
Signature Denial Protocol
Input : Prover : Secret key a 1 , a 2 ∈ LB n (l).
1. V chooses a ∈ r RB n (l) and t ∈ r {1, 2, . . . , k}, computes
2. P computes t by trial and error using
Also, P chooses r randomly and P blob(r,t)
4. P checks the value of Q using a and then P r → V .
5. V opens the blob using the value of r and checks the value of t. If the value of t committed by P is correct, then V accepts thatŜ m is not a valid signature of P . Proof. Completeness: Upon receiving Q from V , P computes
Since (Q 2 /a 1 Q 1 a 2 ) and (Ŝ m /a 1 ya −1 1 ) are known to P , P can compute the value of t by trial and error as the value of t is small.
Soundness: a hides t in the challenge Q. Since the value committed to by the blob cannot be changed, P 's best strategy is to guess the value of t, and there are k choices for t. Hence the protocol is sound. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed some undeniable signature schemes using braid groups.
Some of these schemes enjoy the zero-knowledge property. We used braid groups m xa, where a, b, c ∈ RB n (l). The advantage with this modification is that there can be more choices, for a, b, c ∈ RB n (l) which give the same value of Q but giving different values of R. This makes the task of a cheating prover P * to guess the value of R harder, which in turn makes the probability for a cheating prover P * to convince V to acceptŜ m / ∈ SIG(m) smaller. The denial protocol given in Section 4.4 can also be similarly modified.
In this paper we have not carried out any investigation regarding the validity of the Assumption 3.1. We leave this problem for future investigation. Getting a theoretical justification for this assumption appears to be too hard. However, numerical experiments might throw some light on this assumption.
There are many desirable features for a good undeniable signatures like con-vertibility (the possibility to transform undeniable signatures into regular ones), delegation (enabling selected third parties to confirm/deny signatures but not to sign). We have not considered these problems in this paper. Hence we hope that this study will motivate further research on digital signature schemes based on braid group as well as other nonabelian groups.
The birth of braid cryptography has stimulated the search for other exotic mathematical structures for doing public-key cryptography. The public-key cryptography has been treated under the head of number theory and finite fields only. With the birth of braid cryptography a broader perspective on public-key cryptography has emerged. People have started looking at other nonabelian groups [25] , [24] , [20] , [11] and combinatorial groups [22] , [21] for building public-key cryptosystems. Hence we hope that this study will further stimulate the search for other mathematical structures as a better alternative to the number theoretic and discrete log based cryptosystems.
